Judicial review may be the most publicly contested aspect of American constitutionalism. When courts void legislation, they implicitly seem to strike at the heart of the principle of separation of powers. The act inherently suggests that the elected legislature is not always the legitimate representative of the people and that democratic majoritarianism is not the fundamental principle of American politics. Because judicial review can be described in opposition to ideas often deemed fundamental to American constitutionalism, the origins of judicial review have intrigued scholars of politics, history, and law. 1 For the last century, the origins inquiry has started from the assumption that the origins of judicial review lie in an idea, an intellectual doctrine about judicial power. In fact, the origins of judicial review lie in a pre-Revolutionary practice and idea of limited legislative authority.
The conventional story, recounted in most law school casebooks and therefore drilled into the minds of most lawyers, does not discuss pre-Revolutionary practices. It begins in 1803 with Marbury v. Madison. 2 In some versions, Chief Justice Marshall invents judicial review himself, often constructed as a sneaky judicial power grab. In other versions, he draws on a seventeenth-century English legal idea or early state judicial precedents to claim this power for the federal judiciary over congressional legislation. In all of these versions, American colonial legal practices are inaccurately given little significance and judicial review presented as an issue of the legitimacy of the judiciary.
political science are largely due to the influential early twentieth-century scholarship of Edward Corwin. Prior to Corwin, those who discussed the origins of judicial review struggled to reconcile historical practice and ideas; after Corwin, ideas alone proved decisive. The growing division among law, history, and political science ensured that this significant shift in approach was not revisited. 6 This brief essay recovers the pre-Corwin discussion about the origins of judicial review to demonstrate the way in which the approach to judicial review as an idea has been, itself, historically constructed by scholarly inclination, disciplinary identification, and the availability of historical materials. Many scholars writing on the origins issue between 1880 and 1920 were motivated by the contemporary Supreme Court; this essay does not delve into the politics of the debate. Over the years, these historical arguments and the conception of idea and practice have favored or opposed the Court depending on the political alignment of the Court and Congress. Instead, this essay focuses on the conception of judicial review and the perceived relevance of colonial experience and practice.
Judicial Review as Doctrine and Practice
What contemporary scholars and the public call "judicial review" originally had no such name. Indeed, until the early twentieth century, commentators identified it descriptively as courts voiding legislation repugnant to a constitution. After the Civil War, three different understandings of the origins of this judicial capacity arose. These understandings can be linked with individual lawyers whose intellectual and professional backgrounds guided their inquiries. The judicially oriented Horace Gray described this judicial capacity as an intellectual doctrine with roots in seventeenth-century English law, in particular, Dr. Bonham's Case. The young lawyer William Meigs saw it as part of a new political science traceable through materials related to the Constitution's framing. The lawyer-historian Brinton Coxe suggested it could be viewed as a practice with origins in the colonial imperial relationship, in particular, the Privy Council's review in Winthrop v. Lechmere. At the end of the century, Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer sought to embrace all three understandings.
Horace Gray (1828-1902), perhaps more than others, was initially responsible for the argument that the doctrine of "judicial duty" had its origins in seventeenth-century English law. In 1865, Gray wrote an appendix to a collection of reports of Massachusetts colonial court cases. 7 The volume as a whole implicitly suggested continuities between the current Supreme Judicial Court and its colonial predecessor. Gray's interest lay in a 1761 case involving an argument by James Otis, a Massachusetts lawyer and future Revolutionary and, in particular, one aspect of this argument. In the case, Otis reportedly argued that "as to Acts of Parliament, an Act against the Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is void." 8 Gray had to go out of his way to comment on this sentence. Otis's comment actually never appeared in the reports because the author, Josiah Quincy, had been "absent . . . most of the Time" during Otis's argument. 9 Gray concluded that "the principle of American Constitutional Law, that it is the duty of the judiciary to declare unconstitutional statutes void" had been "foreshadowed" in the argument by Otis. 10 Gray referred to this belief as a "doctrine," "a favorite in the Colonies before the Revolution."
11 Gray found its origins in particular in Chief Justice Edward Coke's comment in Dr. Bonham's Case (1610). 12 Although the reference to Coke had appeared previously, Gray linked it tightly and approvingly to the judicial duty. 13 He declared that "this duty was recognized, and unconstitutional acts set aside, by courts of justice, even before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States." 14 This power was thus now "too well settled to require an accumulation of authorities
Gray's approach reflected his judicial viewpoint. Born in 1828, Gray had come of age amid Boston antislavery discussions. Between 1854 and 1861, he served as reporter to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and, in 1864, became a justice on that Court. 16 The Massachusetts Court had accepted that courts had the power to void legislation repugnant to the Constitution since the early nineteenth century. 17 Gray's comfort with this capacity was evident in an 1857 critique he wrote of the Dred Scott decision. Nowadays, the decision is often classified as the second example of judicial review, but Gray did not view the case in that category. Gray's criticism focused instead on the unnecessary "extrajudicial" reach of the decision. 18 The analysis also characterized Gray's larger idea about the origins of American law. He had become a court reporter at twenty-six. The "indefatigable research" and focus on judicial cases was characteristic. 19 The desire to connect American legal doctrine with English legal precedents would further typify Gray's vision. He "delighted to go to the fountains of the law and trace its growth from the beginning." 20 On the Supreme Court, he became known for studying "expositions of law most eagerly in the opinions of the English judges, which seemed to him to furnish the best standards for the American courts." 21 Gray's argument about this judicial doctrine proved more influential than might have been expected of comments made in an appendix to a volume of colonial reports. His friends at Harvard Law School, where his half-brother, James Chipman Gray, taught, included another important commentator on the judicial doctrine, James Bradley Thayer. In 1882, Gray had the opportunity to apply his ideas about judicial duty to the Supreme Court when he became a Justice on the United States Supreme Court, serving for twenty years. Although in the 1870s, the Court had begun to void congressional legislation, after Gray joined, the Court increasingly seemed comfortable with judicial review. Among other decisions, Gray joined the majority in the controversial decision in the Civil Rights Cases (1883), holding unconstitutional the 1875 Civil Rights Act. 22 The following year, he wrote the majority opinion in Juilliard v. Greenman (1884), the last of the legal tender cases. 23 Lastly, Gray may have had a direct influence on later advocates of judicial review, in particular, Louis Brandeis, who served as a judicial clerk for Gray on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 24 A young Philadelphia lawyer, William Meigs (1852 Meigs ( -1929 , found the Coke argument less persuasive. Meigs would go on to write biographies of Charles Jared Ingersoll, John Calhoun, and Thomas Hart Benton. 25 He would become perhaps best known for The Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787, which published for the first time the draft of the Constitution used by the Committee of Detail. 26 The subtitle explained the impressive work: "An effort to trace the origin and development of each separate clause from its first suggestion in that body to the form finally approved." 27 This fascination with the constitutional founding appeared in Meigs's influential 1885 article on the judicial "power." 28 Meigs rejected the Coke argument as based on "a few scattering cases" better explained as basic interpretative principles or "vagaries inspired by an overweaning admiration for the common law and a bold and independent spirit." 29 He declared, instead, that the power was "emphatically a new departure in governmental science." 30 The assertion of this "new and original" doctrine could be traced in a series of state cases decided between 1778 and 1787. 31 Meigs discussed what has become a familiar line-up: Phillips (Virginia, 1778); Common 32 Having established the judicial doctrine in the states, Meigs turned to the Federal Convention. He declared that "these assertions of power by the courts were in general approved by the country, and Gerry expressly stated so in the Federal Convention." 33 Relying on Elliott's Debates, Meigs counted six delegates in support at the Federal Convention and numerous others in support at state ratifying conventions. 34 He argued that the Federalist discussed it "not as a novelty" but to "answer objections which might still trouble some persons." 35 In legal commentators, post-1787 state and federal cases, and finally Marbury, Meigs found repeated acceptance of the doctrine. 36 He concluded that "the doctrine has been received" with "unanimity and general absence of serious conflict." 37 For Meigs, the founding origins story did not answer questions related to the application of the judicial power in contemporary debates. In particular, Meigs believed that the early history did not demonstrate that judicial decisions had been judged conclusive. He insisted that the earlier theory was that "there is no department of the government which can irrevocably settle for all whether such or such a power can be constitutionally exercised." 38 The judiciary, according to Meigs, did not bind other departments or "conclusively settle the meaning of the constitution."
39 If a department concluded that the court was wrong, it was their "duty" to "decline to follow the judiciary's opinion."
40 Nonetheless, the judiciary had the power.
This argument that judicial power was part of the new political science of American government and that its origins could be traced in founding documents appealed to other young lawyers and practitioners of political science. Charles Burke Elliott (1861-1935) addressed the issue in an article aptly titled "The Legislatures and the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional." Elliott had a law degree from the University of Iowa and received the first Ph.D. in history from the University of Minnesota in 1888. His advisers taught in history and political science. 41 Elliott later became a law professor, judge, and noted author of treatises on corporations and insurance.
The growing influence of political science was evident in the placement of the article in an early issue of the new Political Science Quarterly. 42 Elliott emphasized the way in which the "new and original" idea in political science that "the judiciary was made a co-ordinate department of government" altered understandings of judicial power. 43 Elliott believed that by 1787 "the idea of controlling the legislature through the judiciary must have been familiar" to members of the Convention. 44 As Elliott summarized, the "doctrine" was "the outgrowth of a written constitution and a federal system of government" presumed because of a desire to limit legislative power. 45 Unlike Meigs, Elliott did not find in the historical origins much guidance on precisely when and how the courts should apply the doctrine. His concluding normative discussion was conducted entirely on theoretical grounds. 46 A third group of historically interested lawyers did not view this judicial capacity as part of a new political science invented at the founding or the adoption of an English idea about parliamentary power. They saw similarities in the Privy Council's review of colonial legislation. In particular, they puzzled over the meaning of Winthrop v. Lechmere, an appeal from Connecticut in which the Privy Council had declared void the colony's intestate act. Materials related to Winthrop had begun to appear in the late nineteenth-century publication projects of state historical societies. Based solely on a few documents from the appeal, Brooks Adams-lawyer and historian-had concluded that it showed "the process by which the conception of constitutional limitations became rooted in the minds of the first generation of lawyers." 47 Constitutional limitations on legislative power had predisposed revolutionaries and constitutional framers to judicial power to declare legislation void. The 1890s brought the publication of additional papers related to the Winthrop appeal and its connections to "questions of constitutional law" were further explored. 48 Most influential among these writers was Brinton Coxe (1833-92) . In an influential posthumously published book, An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation (1893), Coxe argued that the Constitution expressly authorized the judicial power. 49 A member of the Philadelphia bar, Coxe had served as president of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. He had long been interested in colonial history and in the general question of the origins of laws. In 1866, he translated a German judge's work on the influence of the Roman law on Bracton. 50 Coxe was apparently "an ardent Democrat and a strict constructionist." 51 A memorialist stated that his "'feeling towards the Constitution . . . was a passion; he was possessed of it, and he mourned almost as a personal calamity whatever he looked on as an impairment of its sacred obligation.'" 52 Coxe's book supported the judicial power. The book ranged far and wide in its effort to bring all sources to bear on the origins of the power. German law, Roman law, cannon law, English law were surveyed. The 1780s cases and Convention commentary were reviewed. Amid this material, one chapter discussed colonial limits on legislation and the Winthrop appeal. Coxe suggested that the appeal might show that a colonial "model existed . . . for the American judicial competency." 53 To aid the reader, Coxe reprinted the order in the Winthrop appeal in the appendix. 54 That the colonial period could be responsible for aspects of American constitutionalism intrigued others. One young historian soon destined for law school explained the constitutional implications at the American Historical Association's annual meeting. 55 Harold D. Hazeltine explained that "during the development of this practice, . . . the important doctrine of American jurisprudence which grants to the judiciary the power of setting aside an act of the legislature as being repugnant to the fundamental law of the land received sanction from England." 56 He sought to illuminate this "neglected phase of our constitutional history." 57 As he declared, "we now appreciate more fully than ever that the systems of society and government developing in the colonies finally come to possess a broader usefulness in the constitutional life of the United States." 58 There had been "doubtless many" cases that would "throw light upon contemporaneous views of the courts as to their powers to interpret colonial charters," but unfortunately only a few were known. 59 Nonetheless, those interested in the intertwining of history and political science found appealing the argument that the judicial power had arisen from colonial and imperial practices. 60 Harvard Law School professor James Bradley Thayer merged these three different claims about the origins of the judicial power. Although Thayer was known for his work in evidence, 61 he also wrote an influential article in 1893 on the "American doctrine of constitutional law." 62 His description of a rule of administration for the "narrow" 63 judicial power is seen as the "first systematic defense of what has come to be known as rationality review." 64 More important, Thayer taught constitutional law at Harvard for many years and wrote Cases on Constitutional Law (1895), a constitutional law casebook. 65 Through the article, constitutional law class, and casebook, Thayer influenced leading legal figures such as Learned Hand, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter. 66 A graduate of Harvard College and Law School, Thayer had worked as a lawyer in Boston before becoming a Harvard professor in 1874. 67 After Thayer's death, one colleague noted that Thayer had loved "his historical work" the best. 68 Another emphasized that Thayer had "little inclination" to show the law as necessarily "perfectly logical or entirely consistent body of legal doctrine." Instead, he was interested in "what the law was, and how it had grown up in this way rather than work out a more systematic and logical theory than the courts had made." 69 Thayer liked the argument that judicial power had its origins in colonial history. In January 1894, Thayer reviewed Coxe's book and referred to "the great colonial case" of Winthrop as a possible precedent for judicial power. 70 That same year, he circulated the draft of his new constitutional law casebook, which included the Privy Council appeal in Winthrop v. Lechmere, as well as the note of his close friend, Horace Gray, on the Coke-Otis connection. 71 His article similarly explored the issue, "How did our American doctrine, which allows to the judiciary the power to declare legislative Acts unconstitutional . . . come about?" 72 Twice Thayer stated that "this remarkable practice" was a "natural result" of colonial political experience. 73 He broadly construed this practice as including enforcement of the colonial charters by forfeiture, by parliament legislation, by "the direct annulling of legislation by the Crown," and by "ultimate appeal to the Privy Council." 74 Thayer found the Coke and founding evidences compatible with this claim. 75 He concluded that the postconstitutional doctrine was merely a "new application of judicial power." 76 As one reviewer of the article noted, Thayer had found the origin in the colonial period's limitation on colonial assemblies. 77 The existence of the colonial practice led in part to Thayer's vision of the appropriate scope of judicial power. 78 Thayer recognized that the practice was in tension with the belief that the "powers of government" could be compartmentalized. 79 The continuation of this practice had given judges a "judicial function" that also involved "taking a part . . . in the political conduct of government." 80 How should the practice and necessity of judicial voiding statutes repugnant to the constitution be balanced with the theory of separation of powers? Thayer's conclusion appeared to be courts should be cautious because they did make law, not merely interpret it. 81 At the end of the nineteenth century, the judiciary's practice of voiding statutes repugnant to the constitution understood as doctrine and practice, had a rich American history that predated Marbury v. Madison. That Coke's comment had some appeal to at least one Revolutionary seemed hard to disprove. That the colonial practice of reviewing legislation and appeals had an impact on generations of colonial Americans seemed persuasive. That the founding generation had reconfigured this history as American seemed compelling.
Judicial Review as Idea
Yet, with the twentieth century, scholars would abandon this rich history for a far simpler story about the origins of American legal and governmental institutions. The Lochner decision reawoke the origins debate. Initially, the debate remained framed by the nineteenth century discussion in which there had not seemed much question that the framers had an understanding of the judicial power. William Meigs himself had absorbed the colonial practice argument into his claim of a new political science. He insisted that "this colonial training had an enormous influence" on the founders. 82 Men "irresistibly think in grooves." 83 Meigs explained, "The mind accustomed to looking upon acts of assembly as possibly void . . . could hardly avoid carrying this idea on into the new system." 84 The colonial origin did not mean that the Court had always used the power correctly. Meigs emphasized, "gross blunders have been made and grave abuses have crept in."
85 Far too often courts made up their minds and then found reasons rather than reserving the power only for cases in which one could have no reasonable doubt about the violation of the constitution.
86
For others, however, the colonial practice claim justified an unjustifiable power and needed to be vanquished. As one author wrote, no Framer had referred to Winthrop v. Lechmere. It was "fantastic . . . to assert that it shaped the conception of judicial power about to be created." 87 Indeed, "legal writers of respectable authority" increasingly suggested that the framers had not intended to grant this power. 88 This debate over whether the Supreme Court had "'usurped' the power to invalidate acts of Congress on constitutional grounds" became a "popular discussion characterized by no little sound and fury." 89 Edward Corwin came to this discussion opposed to the Court's power. He had received his Ph.D. in history in 1905 and was hired by Woodrow Wilson into Princeton's new department of history, politics, and economics. He would become "perhaps the foremost twentiethcentury authority on the Constitution." 90 Compared to Louis Boudin and perhaps even Charles Beard, Corwin was "not markedly ideological in his approach" to the Court and was a "political independent." 91 Nevertheless, Corwin's scholarship on the origins of judicial review had a particular conception of constitutionalism. Corwin had doubts about "judicial paramountcy," describing the Court as "another human, and therefore presumably fallible, institution-a bench of judges." 92 In bestowing the term "judicial review" upon this capacity, Edward Corwin permanently reframed twentieth-century understandings of the role of courts. In 1906, he suggested that from pure dicta in 1782, the judicial capacity had become the "foundation rule of American constitutional law." 93 By 1909, Corwin began to call the doctrine "judicial review" and started work on his tentatively titled book, The Growth of Judicial Review. 94 Corwin proclaimed "the rationalistic background of American constitutional history." 95 Colleague Charles McIlwain's interest in "tracing the history of certain legal ideas," in particular, fundamental law and the differentiation of legislation and adjudication, was influential. 96 Corwin mocked "those who would insist upon its institutional background." 97 They were the "disciples of Savigny in the field of legal history," swayed by "the doctrine of evolution." 98 Corwin argued that whenever the "Constitutional Fathers" borrowed "from the past any of the really distinctive features of our constitutional system . . . they will be found to have taken them, not in the form of institutions tested and hammered into shape by practice, but as raw ideas." His claim was clear: the Framers' "indebtedness to the past was for ideas rather than for institutions." 99 Corwin declared the "truth": judicial review rested on foundations "entirely independent of American colonial history." 100 The origins of judicial review-the "idea of legislative power as limited"-were in the "idea of fundamental law." All "law and doctrine" on judicial review "goes back finally to Coke's famous dictum in Dr. Bonham's case." 101 Corwin repeated Gray's genealogy, emphasizing Otis's comment and declaring that "then and there American constitutional theory was born." 102 Although neither Otis nor Coke was mentioned at the Convention, Corwin declared that Winthrop was "totally unknown to those who brought about judicial review." 103 The interest in ideas gathered strength. The 1911 publication of Max Farrand's masterpiece, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, made easily accessible the Convention records. 104 The original index contained no entry for "judicial review," but it did list "Laws contrary to the Constitution, power of the courts over." 105 In 1912, Charles Beard, an associate "professor of politics" at Columbia, reviewed the Constitutional Convention evidence in Farrand's volumes. Beard concluded that "judicial control over legislation was implied in the provisions of the federal Constitution." 106 Beard's inquiry into the "intention of the framers" and the appearance of Farrand's Records reframed the inquiry. 107 Historian Andrew McLaughlin acknowledged that "probably this historical background-colonial experience, the nature and the practices of the imperial system-had its effect." Indeed, without "this colonial experience the courts might not have come to exercise the power"; nonetheless, McLaughlin insisted, the "main line of argument and the main ideas" arose during the Revolution. 108 In 1914, Corwin described himself now as one of a group of legalhistorians "who represent judicial review as the natural outgrowth of ideas that were common property in the period when the Constitution was established." 109 The colonial practice argument had collapsed so quickly that his book, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, discussed it only in the notes. As the epigraph declared, quoting Maitland, "The history of law must be a history of Ideas." 110 Corwin's triumph was not absolute. At Columbia, students of Herbert Osgood and others continued to attempt to argue that colonial institutions and practices had contributed to constitutionalism. Arthur Meier Schlesinger described how the Privy Council was "analogous" to the Supreme Court and noted that appeals "involved the important principle of American jurisprudence which accords to the judiciary the power of declaring invalid an act of a subordinate legislature." 111 Elmer Beecher Russell showed pervasive Privy Council review of colonial legislation. He claimed that the colonists "thus became accustomed to a limitation upon the power of their legislatures." As he put it, this practice was "at once a precedent and a preparation for the power of judicial annulment upon constitutional grounds." 112 It was all too late. Judicial review, indeed American constitutionalism, was now comprised of legal ideas, not imperial or colonial institutions, politics, and practices. The Constitution broke American history in two. The colonial period led to the Revolution. The constitutional period began after that. This redefinition doomed Columbia Law Professor Joseph Smith's magnificent institutional and procedural account of the Privy Council's appellate jurisdiction to a struggle over whether Privy Council review represented an idea about judicial or legislative authority. 113 
Constitutionalism as Idea and Practice
The time might be ripe to reconsider this depiction of the origins of judicial review and of constitutionalism as the history of ideas. As the Court's politics changed, Corwin himself grew uncomfortable with his insistence on the "juristic doctrine of judicial review." By the late 1930s, he acknowledged that judicial review is "a practice, an institution of government." 114 Judicial review is both-an idea and a practice. Contemporary constitutional scholars have begun to show renewed interest in the conception of constitutionalism as practice. Lawrence Sager analyzes our "constitutional practice."
115 Richard Fallon discusses "implementing" constitutional norms through practice. 116 Barry Friedman advocates abandonment of the "predominantly normative" approach to judicial review for the positive and descriptive approach of contemporary political science. 117 These scholars recognize that for far too long American constitutionalism has been only about ideas, not practices.
As this brief historiography suggests, the conception of judicial review as an idea developed from the approach taken to the question rather than because it was the inherently correct answer. Cases and Convention records could be read as textual evidence in a closed intellectual system that revealed a coherent idea about judicial power. It was much harder to prove definitively that everyday colonial political practices had formed a set of assumptions about limited legislative authority. These differing conclusions about the origins of judicial review also rested on larger disciplinary assumptions. The influence of Dr. Bonham's Case presumed a certain autonomy of legal ideas across time and space; the claim of colonial practice presumed a certain degree of continuity despite American independence; the argument for a new political science presumed a certain discontinuity and rejection of English and colonial constitutionalism.
The recovery of the importance of colonial practices to the origins of judicial review does not need to result in the abandonment of the importance of legal ideas and doctrines. Discussing judicial review as practice, however, demonstrates that at least some ideas of American constitutionalism have their origins in political and legal experience rather than the legal imagination. Reconstructing the origins of judicial review in English and colonial practice resurrects an earlier idea about limited legislative authority and thus enriches contemporary discussions of American constitutionalism. Finally, the recognition that American constitutionalism is the result of new political ideas and the adaptation of older legal and political practices demonstrates that aspects arising from the adaptation of colonial constitutionalism coexist in tension with those arising from post-Revolutionary theories of governance. As a historical matter, American constitutionalism was not a single, coherent political science.
Judicial review was not invented by historians, political scientists, or law professors. Because judicial review arose from a colonial practice, history has something to contribute. Because judicial review was rationalized as compatible with a written constitution and separation of powers, political science has something to contribute. Because judicial review involves interpreting the boundary between legitimate legislative power and unconstitutional authority, law has something to contribute. We may not be able to stop calling the practice judicial review, but scholars can begin to think more critically and constructively about the ways in which the story of its origins has often been the story of ourselves and our unspoken disciplinary assumptions.
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